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Growing numbers of lesbian and gay couples in the United States
are choosing to have families.1 While figures vary considerably, sources
estimate that nationwide, lesbian and gay parents are raising between six
and fourteen million children.2 Lesbians in particular are having chil-
dren in increasing numbers, a trend commentators have termed the
"lesbian baby boom."3 While many children raised by lesbian parents
* J.D. 1995, Yale Law School.
1. See Gina Kolata, Lesbian Partners Find Means to Be Parents, N.Y. TEms, Jan. 30,
1989, at A13.
2. See Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HAuv. L
Rprv. 1508, 1629 (1989) (estimating that three million gays and lesbians in the
United States are parents, and eight to ten million children are raised in gay or
lesbian households (citing ABA Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law
Experts, 13 FAm. L REP. (BNA) 1512, 1513 (Aug. 25, 1987))); Jayne Keedle,
Bringing Up Baby: Gay and Lesbian Parents Are Redrawing the Boundaries of the
American Family, NEw HAVEN ADvoc., Dec. 1, 1994, at 11 (estimating that six to
fourteen million children are growing up in at least four million gay and lesbian
households).
3. See, e.g., William A. Henry III, Gay Parents: Under Fire and on the Rise, TmE, Sept.
20, 1993, at 66. This article will focus primarily on lesbian parents, although many
of the legal and socio-political issues facing gay male parents are essentially equiva-
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
were conceived or adopted in previous heterosexual relationships, 4 a
significant number are being conceived in lesbian relationships through
artificial insemination-between five and ten thousand by some esti-
mates.
5
Advances in reproductive technologies and some ebbing in societal
intolerance have made it easier for lesbian couples to have families of
their own, yet these couples continue to face legal barriers. Because
same-sex marriage is not permitted in any state,6 the nonbiological
mother, or "co-parent," is a legal stranger to her child, despite her
involvement in planning for, raising, and supporting the child. Conse-
quently, a number of co-parents have sought parental rights by petition-
ing courts for the adoption of their children.7
These petitions for so-called "second-parent adoption" have posed
unique challenges for state courts. On the one hand, adoption is gov-
erned solely by statute,8 and no state statute explicitly permits second-
lent. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (granting joint
adoption to a gay male couple).
4. Eloise Salholz, The Future of Gay America, NEwswEEK, March 12, 1990, at 20
(estimating that three to five million lesbian and gay parents have had children in
heterosexual relationships).
5. See Leslie Dreyfous, "Divorced" Lesbians and Gays Challenging Legal Definition of
Parent, L.A. Tias, Apr. 28, 1991, at A39 (estimating ten thousand); Jean
Seligmann, Variations on a Theme, Nnwswmix, Spec. Ed. Winter/Spring 1990, at
39 (five to ten thousand); Angela Smyth & Julia Brosnan, Me and My Mums, THE
GuARDIAN, Nov. 14, 1994, at 10-11 (reporting that a recent survey found that one
thousand children were born to lesbian women in San Francisco alone). For other
sources suggesting even higher numbers, see Henry, supra note 3 (reporting on
Pacific Reproductive Services, a San Francisco clinic, where more than 100 lesbians
use the sperm bank each month); Can Gays Make Good Parents? (CNN television
broadcast, Dec. 29, 1992) (reporting that lesbian women give birth to about five
thousand children each year).
6. Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 2, at 1606.
7. The New York Court of Appeals cast the issue as follows:
Under the New York adoption statute, a single person can adopt a child.
Equally dear is the right of a single homosexual to adopt. These appeals
call upon us to decide if the unmarried partner of a child's biological
mother, whether heterosexual or homosexual, who is raising the child
together with the biological parent, can become the child's second parent
by means of adoption.
In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833, at *1 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995) (citation
and footnote omitted).
8. ANGELA RI HOLDER, LEGAL IssuEs n PEDIATRICS AND ADOLE C ENT MEDICINE 204
(2d ed. 1985) (citing Stephen B. Presser, The Hiftorical Background of Amercan
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L 143 (1972)). See aho In re Jacob, 1995 WL 643833, at *2
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parent adoption.' In fact, many statutes contain substantial impedi-
ments to such arrangements.'" Further, courts are reluctant to invade
legislative prerogatives in such statutory areas-particularly if their
decisions would effectively legitimize an alternative family unit to which
most of society remains hostile. On the other hand, courts face a fait
accompli since the child is already with the lesbian couple. To deny the
adoption petition would only harm the interests of the child," an effect
contrary to the general purpose and express provisions of most adoption
statutes. 12
An outcome of this conflict is that in recent years courts in rough-
ly a dozen states and the District of Columbia have granted second-
parent adoptions to lesbian and gay couples, overcoming statutory
barriers by liberally interpreting provisions of adoption statutes in the
best interests of the child.' 3 Yet these decisions have done more than
simply create an additional avenue for adoption. Courts' recognition of
second-parent adoption has conferred upon lesbian-headed family units
(citing In re Eaton, 305 N.Y. 162, 165 (1953) (noting that adoption law is "solely
the creature of .... statute")).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 16-26.
12. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. S=xr. ch. 40, para. 1525 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1994)
("The best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of paramount
consideration in the construction and interpretation of this [Adoption] Act.").
13. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of
L.S. & V.L., Nos. A-269-90, A-270-90, 1991 WL 219598 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug.
30, 1991); In re Petition of K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (III. App. Ct. 1995);
In re the Petition of E.S. & RL. to Adopt M.L.S., No. 90 Coa 1202, 1994 WL
157949 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 1994); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass.
1993); Adoption of Susan, 619 N.E.2d 323 (Mass. 1993); Adoption of a Child by
J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); Adoption of Evan, 583
N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992); Adoption of Caidin & Emily, 622 N.Y.S.2d
835 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994); Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt.
1993); In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995); Adop-
tion of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. A.D. 1995). In
addition, courts have reportedly granted second-parent adoptions in unpublished
opinions in Alaska, California, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Washington. Janan Hanna, Adoptions by Gays Face New Tests in Courts, CHi.
TRIB., Nov. 30. 1994, § 2, at 5.
But see In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (denying second-
parent adoption petition on statutory grounds); Adoption of Baby Z (Conn. P. Ct.
[docket number blocked out] May 12, 1994) (denying second-parent adoption
petition on statutory grounds) (appeal expected).
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a degree of legal status denied by legislatures 4 and opposed by a major-
ity of society. 15 This anomalous right emerges because the virtually
unprotected family law rights of lesbians happen to converge with the
highly protected interests of children. The result is that the former can
ride the latter into legally recognized status. Nevertheless, the continued
divergence between this new right and the views of the political and
popular mainstream creates tension that may, in turn, yield opposing
outcomes. In some jurisdictions the tension may abate as newly created
legal norms generate social norms more tolerant of alternative family
arrangements, thereby enforcing the family right. In other jurisdictions
the tension may provoke the abrogation of lesbian and gay partners'
newly created rights through legislative override or judicial overrule.
Part I of this Article will discuss some of the legal difficulties
associated with co-parenting and why lesbian couples have sought
second-parent adoptions. Part II will examine the particular statutory
obstacles to second-parent adoptions and then analyze the various ways
courts in several states have overcome these obstacles. Finally, Part III
will discuss the implications of these decisions in terms of their creation
of legal and social norms.
I. LEGAL DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH CO-PARENTING
Suppose, for example, that a lesbian couple living together in a
long-term, committed relationship decides to have a child. One of the
women conceives a child through artificial insemination. 6 The other
woman participates in the birthing process, is present at the birth, and
is equally involved in supporting and raising the child.' This
14. See generally Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 2,
at 1603-29; NAnoNAL LAwYERs GUILD, SECUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
§§ 1.01-.07 (Roberta Achtenberg et al. eds., 1994); WliwLm B. RUBENS EIN,
LESBIANs, GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 77-154, 377 (1993).
15. See infra text accompanying note 65. See generally HOMOPHOBIA: AN OVERVIEW
(John P. DeCecco ed., 1984)(containing empirical studies of attitudes toward
homosexuality).
16. The following analysis is not limited to cases in which children have been conceived
through artificial insemination. Nevertheless, in virtually all of the reported cases
concerning second-parent adoption, the children were so conceived. E.g., In re
Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995); Adoption of Two
Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. A.D. 1995).
17. See, e.g., Adoptions of B.LVB. & E.LVB., 628 A.2d at 1272; Adoption of Two
Children by H.N.R, 666 A.2d at 536.
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nonbiological co-parent is essentially a "legal stranger" to her own
child."8 The child may not be eligible for the the co-parent's disability,
health, or life insurance benefits. 19 If the biological mother dies or
becomes incapacitated, the child would not automatically remain with
the co-parent.20 The surviving co-parent could lose custody of the child
to the child's other biological parent-the donor-or to other relatives
of the child, even if those relatives had no prior relationship with or ties
to the child.2' Further, if the co-parent dies intestate, the child may not
be able to inherit from her. And upon the co-parent's death, the child
would also fail to qualify for the co-parent's social security benefits. 22
Similarly, if the mothers split, nothing guarantees that the co-parent,
without an adoptive or biological link to the child, could obtain cus-
tody or visitation rights, or have child support obligations. 23
While a couple could execute various legal instruments to address
some of these problems,24  none of these instruments give the
nonbiological co-parent rights and obligations equal to those of the
natural mother, nor do these instruments have the force of an adoption
or guardianship. 25 For example, the natural parent could appoint the
co-parent testamentary guardian of the child in the event of the natural
mother's death. But even where a nomination of guardianship or
18. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 n.8 (Mass. 1993) (dictum).
19. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 27. In one case, a couple
decided to pursue a second-parent adoption petition when, after the natural mother
lost her job, the co-parent's health insurer refused to include her children under her
policy. Two Gay Adoption Cases Go to Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at
25.
20. Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 2, at 1655.
21. Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 2, at 1655.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1994); NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LESBIANS
CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DONOR INSEMINATION AND Co-
PARENTING 26 (Maria Gil de Lamadrid ed., 1991).
23. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991) (holding in a custody
dispute between separated lesbian parents that the biological mother had sole right
to custody); A.L. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
lesbian co-parent does not have standing to seek visitation rights with the child that
she and her former partner, the biological mother, had during their fourteen-year
relationship); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 651 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that
although a co-parent had had a six year relationship with the child's biological
mother and had jointly cared for and made decisions about the child, the co-parent
had no legal standing to seek visitation with the child). See generally, Achtenberg,
supra note 14, § 1.04[3] [a], at 1-82 to 1-83.
24. See generally NAToNAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 20-24
(listing documents that protect the rights of the non-biological or non-adoptive
parent); Achtenberg, supra note 14, § 1.04[3].
25. See Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 2, at 1659.
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conservatorship has been executed, a third party relative could still
successfully challenge the co-parent's custody upon the natural mother's
death.26
Consequently, lesbian parents have sought second-parent adoptions
whereby the nonbiological co-parent adopts the child without severing
the biological parent's own parental rights and responsibilities.2 7 How-
ever, women who petition for second-parent adoptions have encoun-
tered formidable legal and social barriers. They must convince a court
to construe governing statutes in novel ways, creating a legal relation-
ship to which much of society remains opposed.
II. OVERCOMING STATUTORY BARRIERS TO
SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
A. Statutory Barriers
An individual seeking a second-parent adoption faces a statutory
catch-22. Normally, an adoption decree terminates the legal rights and
obligations between the child and his or her natural parents and
26. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 n.8 (Mass. 1993) (observing that
although natural mother designated co-mother guardian of child in will, co-mother's
custody of child could conceivably be contested in the event of natural mother's
death, particularly by donor, members of donor's family, or members of natural
mother's family) ("Absent adoption, [the co-mother] would not have a dispositive
legal right to retain custody of [the child], because she would be a 'legal stranger' to
the child."). See also Achtenberg, supra note 14, § 1.04[3][a], at 1-82. Nevertheless,
a co-parent may be able to claim custody in the event of the death of or separation
from the biological mother under the "psychological parent" theory. See Develop-
ments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 2, at 1655 (citing
JOsEPH GoLDsTEN Er AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERsT ov THE CmLD 98 (1973)
(defining psychological parent as an adult who, regardless of biological relationship
to the child, "on a continuing, day-to-day basis... fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs.")).
27. See generally Elizabeth Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented
Families: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAvis L Rpv. 729 (1986)
(urging judges to grant second-parent adoptions without requiring the natural
parent to relinquish her tights and responsibilities); Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Adop-
tion of a Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R.5th 54 (1995). Although I will
discuss second-parent adoptions by lesbian partners of the biological parents,
heterosexual partners have successfully petitioned for second-parent adoptions in
some cases. See, e.g., In re Jessica W., 453 A.2d 1297 (N.H. 1982) (granting adop-
tion of illegitimate child by natural father); In re A.J.J., 438 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1981) (granting adoption of child by natural father who refused to marry
for political reasons); In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833 (N.Y. Nov. 2,
1995) (granting second-parent adoption to heterosexual partner in one of two
consolidated cases).
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replaces them with similar rights and obligations between the child and
the new adoptive parents.2" Strictly applied, this regime would preclude
second-parent adoption. A co-parent's adoption of her partner's child
would terminate the natural mother's legal rights.29 The only statutory
exception to this automatic termination of the natural parent's rights is
in the case of stepparent adoption: when the child is adopted by a legal
parent's new spouse.3 But this so-called stepparent exception, if literally
construed, is unavailable to lesbian petitioners because the co-parent
cannot be the legal "spouse" of the natural mother.3'
28. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 6 (Law. Co-op. 1995) (providing that upon
entry of an adoption decree, "all rights, duties and other legal consequences of the
natural relation of child and parent shall ... terminate between the child so
adopted and his natural parents ... ."); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 117(1)(a)
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing that upon adoption "the natural
parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all
responsibilities for and shall have no rights over such adoptive child .... "). See
generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF Domimsc RELATIONS IN THE UNIT-
ED STATES § 21.1 (2d ed. 1987) (defining adoption as the legal process by which a
child acquires parents other than her natural parents, and parents acquire a child
other than their natural child).
29. In addition, some statutes require that all adoptions other than by stepparents or
blood relatives be placed through an agency. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-
727(3) (1993). This would require that the biological mother first surrender her
child to an agency before the child could be adopted by her and her partner. Yet
there is no guarantee that the agency would not grant custody of the child to
another couple. This provision has proved a formidable obstacle to second-parent
adoption in the state. See Adoption of Baby Z (Conn. P. Ct. [docket number
blocked out] May 12, 1994).
30. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (1981 & Supp. 1994) (requiring that upon
adoption "[a]ll rights and duties" between the adoptee and his natural parents "are
cut off, except that when one of the natural parents is the spouse of the adoptor
[sic], the rights and relations as between adoptee, that natural parent, and his
parents.., are in no wise altered."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(a) (West 1993 &
Supp. 1994) (providing that "[t]he entry of a judgment of adoption shall terminate
all relationships between the adopted child and his parents.., provided, however,
that when the plaintiff is a stepfather or stepmother of the adopted child and the
adoption is consummated with the consent and approval of the mother or father,
respectively, such adoption shall not affect or terminate any relationship between
the child and such mother or father or any tights, duties or obligations based
thereupon."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (providing "[t]he
natural parents of a minor shall be deprived, by the adoption, of all legal right to
control of such minor .... Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this
section, when the adoption is made by a spouse of a natural parent, obligations of
obedience to, and rights of inheritance by and through the natural parent who has
intermarried with the adopting parent shall not be affected.").
31. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wis. 1994) (holding that the
stepparent exception did not apply to nonmarital partners).
19951
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B. Overcoming Barriers through Liberal
Statutory Interpretation
The only way a same-sex couple can obtain a second-parent adop-
tion, therefore, is to convince a court to construe the existing adoption
statute liberally in order to serve the best interests of the child involved.
Although a general rule of statutory construction holds that statutes in
derogation of the common law shall be strictly construed by the
courts,32 adoption statutes have sometimes been an exception to this
rule, either by explicit instruction or judicial construction. Some adop-
tion statutes explicitly instruct that their provisions be construed liber-
ally.3 3 Where such an instruction does not exist, some courts have em-
ployed statutory purpose arguments to construe the statute liberally.
They have reasoned that because the language and history of the statute
are silent regarding the permissibility of adoption by the unmarried
partner of the natural parent,34 courts should broadly construe the
statute to serve its overriding purpose: to promote and protect the
child's best interests.35 Consequently, when courts have found that a
second-parent adoption would serve this purpose, they have liberally
32. CLtRK, supra note 28, at § 21.4.
33. See, e.g., ILi ANN. STAr. Ch. 40, para. 1524 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1994)
("This Act shall be liberally construed, and the rule that statutes in derogation of
the common law must be strictly construed shall not apply to this Act."). See also In
re K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (applying this provision in
holding second-parent adoption permitted by Illinois law); Adoption of Two
Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting "N.J.S.A.
9:3-37 requires that the 'act be liberally construed to the end that the best interests
of children be promoted' "). Butsee In reAngel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 681 n.3
(holding second-parent adoption not permitted by Wisconsin law notwithstanding
similar statutory instruction that adoption act be construed liberally).
34. See, e.g., Adoption of B.L.V.B. & E.L..B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Vt. 1993)
(noting that the relevant adoption provision was adopted in its present form in
1947 and that "[i]t is highly unlikely that the legislature contemplated the possibili-
ty of adoptions by same-sex partners, and the scant legislative history does not indi-
cate that such adoptions were considered."); In re L.S. & V.L., Nos. A-269-90, A-
270-90, 1991 WL 219598, at *3 (D.C. Super. Aug. 30, 1991); Adoption of
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993).
35. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318; In re KM. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995). See also In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833, at *2
(N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995) ("What is to be construed strictly and applied rigorously in
this sensitive area of the law ... is legislative purpose as well as legislative lan-
guage."). See generally Clark, supra note 28, at § 21.8, at 653 ("In adoption as in
custody the ultimate standard for both agencies and courts is the best interests and
welfare of the child.")
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construed vague or ambiguous provisions in the statute to allow such an
adoption. 6
As additional support for this interpretive approach, several courts
have reasoned that changes in the societal context since the adoption
laws were enacted require a liberal construction of the statutes to con-
form them to modern realities.37 For example, a New York court con-
sidering a second-parent adoption petition observed:
The reality ... is that most children today do not live in so-
called 'traditional' 1950 television situation comedy type
families with a stay-at-home mother and a father who works
from 9:00-5:00.... It is unrealistic to pretend that children
can only be successfully reared in an idealized concept of
family, the product of nostalgia for a time long past.38
Courts have held that such changes in societal patterns support a
liberal interpretation of the statute for two general reasons. First, some
assumptions underlying the existing laws are no longer valid or accu-
rate. Therefore, particular provisions of the statute do not apply to the
present situation and must be waived. For example, a District of Co-
lumbia court waived a termination provision, reasoning that the original
purposes of the provision-to rationalize inheritance and piotect distur-
bance of the adoptive parent-child relationship---did not apply to cases
involving second-parent adoption.3 9 In such cases, the court explained,
these interests would not be disturbed by granting the adoption while
preserving the natural parent's rights.
40
36. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318; Adoption of Caitlin & Emily, 622
N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994). See also discussion, infra part II.C.
37. This practice of interpreting old statutes in light of the present societal context has
been termed "dynamic statutory interpretation" by William Eskridge. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REy. 1479,
1496-97 (1987). See also Heidi A. Sorensen, Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda?
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81 Gao. L.J.
2105 (1993).
38. Adoption of Caitlin & Emily, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 841. See also Adoptions of B.L.V.B.
& E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993); Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632
A.2d 550, 554-55 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
39. See Adoption of Minor (T.), Nos. A-269-90, A-270-90, 1991 WL 219598, at *3-4
(D.C. Super. Aug. 30, 1991).
40. The court noted that the natural parent intended "to remain an active parent and
[had] no desire that her child's right of inheritance from her be curtailed in any
way." Adoption ofMinor (T.), 1991 WL 219598, at *3. Further, the court observed
that adoption would affect no change in the relationship between the child and her
natural or adoptive parent. Adoption of Minor (T), 1991 WL 219598, at "4.
1995]
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Second, societal and demographic changes require adjustments in
the overall statutory framework, rather than the imposition of anachro-
nistic rules on a changed society. A New York family court reasoned
that a dynamic interpretation of the existing adoption statute was
required to accommodate growing numbers of households headed by
unmarried parents, both homosexual and heterosexual.
With the myriad of reproductive techniques available to un-
married women for having children besides heterosexual inter-
course ... coupled with the elimination of the social stigma
attached to having children "out of wedlock," it is obvious
that there will be an increasing number of children similarly
situated to Camilla [the adoptee], for whom legal protections
will be sought through the adoption process. To suggest that
adoption petitions may not be filed by unmarried partners of
the same sex or opposite sex because the legislature has ex-
pressed a desire for these adoptions to occur in the traditional
nuclear family constellation of the 1930s ignores the reality of
what is happening in the population.
41
Thus, construing the statute to require marriage as a precondition of
adoption is incompatible with present realities and often at odds with
the statutory aim of providing children with a stable, two-parent
family.42
C. Specific Statutory Approaches
to Second-Parent Adoption
Courts have employed these justifications for liberal statutory
interpretation to permit second-parent adoptions in two basic ways:
"pseudo-stepparent adoption" and joint adoption.
41. In re Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901-902 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) (citing recent
census figures showing significant increase in "unmarried couple households" with
children in the last two decades). See also In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL
643833, at *5 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995) (citing census figures indicating "fundamental
changes... in the make-up of the family.").
42. See Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d, 997, 999-1001 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992).
[ ol. 3:175
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1. Pseudo-Stepparent Adoption
Courts have granted second-parent adoptions by permitting the co-
parent to adopt as if she were a stepparent. This allows the co-parent to
adopt without triggering the termination provision that would sever the
natural parent's rights. The courts either have held that the termination
provision is directory rather than mandatory,43 or have declined to
apply the provision altogether.44
In reaching these conclusions, courts have reasoned that when
legislatures enacted the termination provisions, they had not imagined
that an unmarried, let alone same-sex, partner of the natural parent
would petition for adoption.45 Therefore courts should not now hold
that the narrow stepparent exception is the exclusive circumstance
occasioning a waiver of the termination provision. 6 Moreover, the pur-
poses of the termination provision are inapplicable in the case of sec-
ond-parent adoption.47 To apply the provision to these cases, the courts
have said, would yield unreasonable"8 and even ludicrous results 9 at
odds with the statute's overarching purpose: protecting the child's best
interests.5°
In some cases, courts have gone slightly further, reasoning that
second-parent adoptions were analogous, or even equivalent, to step-
parent adoptions. The courts have thereby imputed quasi-marital status
to the lesbian couples.' 1 In Adoption ofEvan, the court explained, "[t]he
43. See, e.g., Adoption of Caitlin & Emily, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1994); Adoption of Minor (T.), Nos. A-269-90, A-270-90, 1991 WL 219598, at
*3-4 (D.C. Super. Aug. 30, 1991).
44. See, e.g., In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833, at *9 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995);
Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1000; Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628
A.2d 1271, 1275-76 (Vt. 1993); Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550,
553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
45. See In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833, at *10 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995).
46. See Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993); In re
Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) ("Viewed in the context of
the 1990s, step-parent adoption in nothing more than one form of second-parent
adoption.").
47. See supra text accompanying note 37.
48. Adoptions ofB.L.VB. & E.LVB., 628 A.2d at 1274.
49. In re L.S., Nos. A-269-90, A-270-90, 1991 WL 219598, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Aug. 30, 1991).
50. In re L.S., 1991 W.L. 219598, at 2; In re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833,
at *9 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995).
51. See Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Marriage, 9 NomRE DAME J.L. ETmics &
PUB. Po':y 215, 236 n.63 (1995)(observing that gay marriage is gradually "coming
into law through the back door" of second-parent adoption).
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petitioners are a committed, time-tested life partnership. For Evan, they
are a marital relationship at its nurturing supportive best and they seek
second parent adoption for the same reasons of stability and recognition
as any couple might."' 2 In a similar case in New Jersey, Judge Freed-
man, writing for the majority, asserted, "I am convinced that in this
adoption, J.M.G. should be treated as a stepparent as a matter of
common sense, and in order to protect the child's interests in maintain-
ing her relationship with her biological mother."53 In both of these
cases, the courts essentially ruled that for the purposes of the statute,
the parents were married. Still, the New Jersey court conceded, "[t]he
court feels constrained by the state of the law from proclaiming J.M.G.
an actual 'step-parent' given the fact that same-sex marriages are not
legal in this state."54
2. Joint Adoption
The second way courts have granted second-parent adoptions is by
granting a joint adoption to both the co-parent and the natural parent.
In Adoption of Tammy,55 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
overcame two statutory hurdles to grant a joint adoption petition by
the natural mother and her partner. First, the adoption statute did not
explicitly permit joint adoptions by unmarried people.56 The statutory
scheme provided only that married couples can jointly adopt 57 and that
"a person" may adopt.58 The court reasoned that according to a "legisla-
tively mandated rule of statutory construction ... '[wiords importing
the singular number may extend and be applied to. several persons' as
52. Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992). See also In re
M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (applying the stepparent exception
to a gay couple "by analogy").
53. Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1993).
54. Adoption of a Child by.M.G., 632 A.2d at 553.
55. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
56. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318. This analysis is also applicable to cases in
which lesbian or gay couples seek together to adopt a child to which neither person
has a biological relationship.
57. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (providing that if a married
person petitioned for adoption, his or her spouse must join in the petition if
competent to do so).
58. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
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long as such a construction is consistent with legislative intent.59 Thus,
where the purpose of the statute was to promote the best interests of
the child, and adoption by two unmarried individuals accomplishes this
goal, the court would permit a plural construction of "person."
60
The second barrier to joint adoption was the mandatory termina-
tion requirement.6 ' The court dispensed with this requirement, reason-
ing that the legislature "obviously did not intend that a natural parent's
legal relationship to its child be terminated when the natural parent is
party to the adoption petition."62 Rather, "the termination provision
... was intended to apply only when the natural parents (or parent)
[were] not parties to the petition."63 To apply the termination provision
in the context of joint adoptions, reasoned another court, would yield
"absurd results" and impose "obvious injustice," at odds with the pur-
pose of the statute.
6 4
III. IMPLICATIONS OF GRANTING SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS
In a gradually growing number of cases, courts have legalized the
relationship between the child and co-parent without disturbing the
child's legal relationship with the natural parent. As a consequence,
courts have effectively conferred legal status upon lesbian-headed family
units,65 and to a degree, legally recognized the relationship between the
lesbian parents themselves. 6 Yet a large gap remains between the legal
norms created by these opinions and popular social and political views
opposed to such alternative family units. The tension created by this
gap pervades several court opinions and creates a relatively fragile basis
for this new right. Nevertheless, the legal norms created by these opin-
ions may ultimately have the dffect of generating social norms that will
effectively narrow the gap and bolster family rights of lesbians and gays.
59. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 319.
60. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318-319. Accord In re K.M. & D.M., 653
N.E.2d 888 (IlL. App. Ct. 1995).
61. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
62. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
63. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
64. In re M.M.D. & B.H.M. 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
65. See In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992) (recog-
nizing that granting a second-parent adoption would mean "the creation of a legal
fimily unit identical to the actual family setup.").
66. See generally William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A ReJection on the Search for
Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships 8 J. L & POL. 89 (1991).
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A. Opposition to Lesbian Adoption
Majority public opinion continues to oppose gay and lesbian
adoption, as well as the legal recognition of gay- and lesbian-headed
families. In a 1993 survey, seventy percent of respondents objected to
letting gays adopt children, seventy-three percent opposed same-sex
marriage, and sixty percent opposed legal partnerships between same-sex
couples.67 A high proportion of those with such views reported holding
them very strongly.
68
Conservative politicians and opinion leaders have made opposition
to lesbian and gay households a cause celebre in their quest to safeguard
"family values." For example, in opposing Roberta Achtenberg's ap-
pointment as Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
Sen. Jesse Helms repeatedly raised the fact that she had appeared in a
parade with her lesbian partner and their son.6 9 Another opponent of
gay adoption, Robert Knight of the conservative Family Research
Council, characterized second-parent adoption as "parental malpractice,"
asserting that it was "an attempt to hijack the moral capital of the
mom-and-dad family. "70
Given strong and rather reflexive opposition to lesbian and gay
parenting, it is quite remarkable that some courts have found these
adoptions to be in children's best interests.71 Perhaps this can be ex-
plained by courts' reliance on relatively objective criteria when consider-
ing second-parent adoption petitions. Courts have based their findings
67. Joseph R Shapiro et al., Straight Talk about Gays, U.S. NEws & WoRLD R'poir,
July 5, 1993, at 42.
68. Shapiro et al., supra note 67.
69. Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, May 17, 1993).
70. Desda Moss, Same-Sex Couples Taking Big Step: Parenthooa USA TODAY, Nov. 10,
1993, at 12A. See also Rorie Sherman, Court Lets Lesbian Adopt Partner's Child,
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 23, 1993, at 6 (quoting Craig L. Parshall, president of Wisconsin
Chapter of Rutherford Institute, saying, "[Tihe values transmitted in lesbian and
homosexual couples will be values that th[eir] sexual behavior is as appropriate as
heterosexual. And I don't think our culture or our children ought to be taught that
that behavior is a viable option.").
71. Cf Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 2, at
1630-31 (explaining how many courts continue to apply presumptions against
lesbians and gays in adoption cases); Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual
Parenting: Child Custody andAdoption, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1989)
(describing preconceptions of homosexuality militating against the granting of gay
adoption). See also Achtenberg, supra note 14, § 1.04[2].
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on case-by-case evaluations by independent investigators72 as well as on
empirical studies of children raised by lesbian and gay parents.73 From
these sources, courts have concluded that the adoptions serve not only
the children's legal and economic interests,74 but also their emotional
and psychological interests.75 To be sure, formalizing a parental relation-
ship that already exists in fact requires far less tolerance on the part of
the courts than granting an adoption by a lesbian or gay couple of an
unrelated child.76 Nevertheless, the implication of these decisions is that
popular objections to legal recognition of lesbian- and gay-headed
families are at odds with the explicit public policy goal of protecting the
best interests of children.
72. These indude state agencies and court-appointed guardians ad litem who conduct
home studies. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993);
Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992).
73. Several courts noted that all available research indicates that children do not suffer
any measurable adverse developmental effects from being raised by lesbian or gay
parents. See, e.g., Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (citing, inter alia, Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian
and Gay Parents, 63 CHim Day. 1025, 1031-32 (1992)). See also Adoption of
Caidin & Emily, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 840-41 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994); Adoption of
Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 n.1. See generally, Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of
Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J.
GENDER, LAW & Policy 191, 196-205 (1995) (summarizing social science research
on the development of children raised by lesbian and gay parents); Marc E. Elovitz,
Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-Use of Social Science Research,
2 DuKE J. GENDER, LAw & Poucy 207 (1995).
74. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320-21; Adoption of Evan, 583
N.Y.S.2d at 998-99. For example, the child would be eligible to receive the co-par-
ent's health insurance and social security benefits; would have inheritance rights
from the co-parent; would have the benefit and security of two legal parents willing
to assume responsibilities; and, in the event of a separation, would have a legal right
to child support from the co-parent.
75. Courts have found the family environment provided by lesbian parents to be stable,
nurturing, and healthy. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 316; Adoption
of a Child by J.MG., 632 A.2d at 551-55; Adoption ofEvan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
Courts have also noted that it was important for the emotional well-being of
children to preserve the filial ties between the children and the co-parents in the
event of a separation or death of the natural mother. Adoption of Tammy, 619
N.E.2d at 320.
76. See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (observing that granting
a second-parent adoption "would formalize a parental relationship that [the child]
recognizes in fact, and it would assure that both men are equally committed to
her.").
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B. Courts as Reluctant Architects
Faced with adoption statutes ill-suited to the diversity of contem-
porary family arrangements, courts have become uneasy architects of
new statutory frameworks. Due to the distance between their decisions
and popular views, some courts remain apprehensive about the relatively
radical implications of granting second-parent adoptions. A New York
court stated, "This court is aware that these cases present family units
many in our society believe to be outside the mainstream of American
family life."' And some judges remain opposed to granting such adop-
tions altogether, despite finding that they would be in the children's
best interests. For example, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Lynch of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court suggested that granting the
petition would have the effect of "giving legal status to a relationship by
judicial fiat that our elected representatives and the general public have,
as yet, failed to endorse." s7 Indeed, given that adoption is a creature of
statute, it is somewhat unexpected that courts have created a right
contrary to majority public opinion without explicit authorization by
state legislatures.
Due perhaps to their reticence about their potential role as social
engineers, some courts have sought to distance themselves from the
social implications of their decisions. For example, the Vermont
Supreme Court stated:
It is not the courts that have engendered the diverse composi-
tion of today's families. It is the advancement of reproductive
technologies and society's recognition of alternative lifestyles
that have produced families in which a biological, and there-
fore a legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing prin-
ciple. But it is the courts that are required to define, declare
and protect the rights of children raised in these families ....
We are not called upon to approve or disapprove of the rela-
tionship between the appellants. Whether we do or not, the
fact remains that Deborah has acted as a parent of B.L.V.B.
77. Adoption of Caitlin & Emily, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 841 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1994).
78. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 322 (Lynch, J., dissenting). See aLro In re Jacob,
Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643833, at *19 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995) (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) (admonishing that "courts should not legislate under the guise of
interpretation").
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and E.L.V.B. from the moment they were born. To deny
legal protection of their relationship, as a matter of law, is
inconsistent with the children's best interests and therefore
with the public policy of this state, as expressed in our stat-
utes affecting children.79
The court thus portrays itself as largely a passive actor, responding to
exogenous technological and societal developments and applying the law
according to established principles. The first sentences of both para-
graphs demonstrate the court's efforts to distance itself from any part in
legitimizing this new family unit. Another court sought to isolate the
effect of its grant of a second-parent adoption: "The purpose of this
adoption is not to create a nonmatrimonial legal status for the relation-
ship between the petitioner and the child's biological mother. It is
simply to give legal recognition to [the child's] relationship to her
second parent .... ""
C. Norm Creation
Yet this dichotomy evades the implications of the courts' decisions.
While the purpose may be to give legal recognition to the child-second-
parent relationship, the effect is to provide legal status to a previously
unrecognized family unit. By so doing, the courts' opinions may in turn
engender -such alternative family units. Their opinions will guide not
only lower courts, but also the courts of other states addressing this
legal question. For example, an Illinois court acknowledged that while
cases involving second-parent adoptions in other states are not binding,
"they are instructive, and entitled to respect."'" In addition, as more
courts in more states grant second-parent adoptions, more lesbian
79. Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993).
80. In re Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1994).
81. In re the Petition of E.S. & R.L. to adopt M.L.S., No. 90 Coa 1202, 1994 WL
157949, at *3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 1994). See also Adoption of Tammy, 619
N.E.2d at 321 n.10 (citing as authority in support of granting a second-parent
adoption the Vermont court's interpretation of a statutory provision similar to
Massachusetts'). Nevertheless, courts have not always followed the opinions of other
courts regarding second-parent adoptions, even those within the same jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Mike McKee, What Makes a Family? Wilson Cracks Down on Unmarried
Adoptions, but It's Still Up to the judge, RscoRwaa, Apr. 6, 1995, at 1 (reporting
that a California Superior Court Judge recently denied second-parent adoption on
statutory grounds in a county (Alameda) that "is usually considered gay friendly for
adoptions").
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couples are likely to petition for them.12 For example, since the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court's rulings in Adoption of Tammy and
Adoption of Susan, many additional lesbian second-parent adoption cases
are being filed and granted throughout Massachusetts.13
Decisions granting second-parent adoptions also embolden advo-
cacy groups to expand the right. Lesbian-rights lawyers increasingly ask
courts for opinions with greater precedential and normative weight. As
Paula Ettelbrick of the National Center for Lesbian Rights explained:
In the beginning of the movement [for second-parent adop-
tions], we were keeping the cases quiet... But as each adop-
tion was granted, since the only question was the best interest
of the child, we felt more confident and have been asking
judges to write opinions comparing the adoptions with the
laws in their states.8 4
Finally, the creation of this legal norm may in turn generate social
norms more tolerant of alternative family units. A New Jersey court
seemed sanguine about this prospect: "The court's recognition of this
family unit through the adoption can serve as a step in the path to-
wards the respect which strong, loving families of all varieties deserve." 5
It concluded, "We cannot continue to pretend that there is one formu-
la, one correct pattern that should constitute a family in order to
achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe children should
inhabit."8
CONCLUSION: TiE FUTURE OF SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
For the foreseeable future, second-parent adoption will likely
remain a tenuous right. Not only are courts from different states divid-
ed on the issue, but so are courts within the same state. California
offers a vivid illustration of the fragility and mutability of the right.
82. Cf David W. Dunlap, Support for Gay Adoptions Seems to Wane, N.Y. TIMES, May
1, 1995, at A13 (reporting that New York court ruling that second-parent adoption
not permitted by law had discouraged people considering such adoptions).
83. Josephine Ross, Homestudies in Second-Parent Adoptions, MAss. LAw. WxLu, Oct.
10, 1994, at 11.
84. Joseph E Sullivan, Court Backs Lesbian Right to Adopt a Partner's Child, N.Y.
TiMEs, Aug. 11, 1993, at B5.
85. Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 552 (NJ. Super. Ch. Div. 1993).
86. Adoption ofa Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 554-55.
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Although California courts have granted second-parent adoptions for six
to eight years87 to an estimated three hundred lesbian and gay couples,"8
courts have yet to publish opinions legalizing such adoptions. Conse-
quently, petitioning parents must endure the whim of a presiding judge
who may or may not find such adoptions lawful.8 9 Further, political
forces continue to buffet this fragile right. In March 1995, Governor
Pete Wilson reinstated a previous administrative policy that effectively
requires state Social Service investigators to recommend against adop-
tions by unmarried couples.90 Although judges have routinely ignored
the policy and approved adoptions, including second-parent adoptions
by lesbian and gay parents, judges are now facing increasing pressure to
apply this presumption against lesbian and gay couples seeking to
adopt.
91
Legislative resolution of the issue is unlikely. Notwithstanding
several judges' exhortations to state legislatures to address the issue of
second-parent adoption,92 political bodies seem reluctant to do so.
93
Politically, this is a lose-lose situation: to legalize second-parent adop-
tion would raise the ire of the majority of the public and powerful
interest groups opposed to lesbian and gay parenting; and to pass a law
forbidding such adoption would appear to penalize certain children and
gratuitously discriminate against lesbians and gays. The political divi-
dends of either decision would unlikely outweigh the costs. Hence,
87. Laurie K. Schenden, Gay Couples Have Made Some Progress on the Adoption Front,
with a Growing Number of Judges Allowing Partners to be Co-parent, LA. TiMES,
Sept. 22, 1993, at El.
88. Hanna, supra note 13 (quoting estimate by Kathryn Kendall, legal director for San
Francisco-based National Council for Lesbian Rights).
89. See McKee, supra note 81, at 1.
90. The policy was rescinded in December 1994, only to be reinstated by Governor
Wilson in March 1995. McKee, supra note 81, at 12.
91. McKee, supra note 81, at 12 (quoting Steve Sheldon, spokesperson for the conserva-
tive Anaheim-based Traditional Values Coalition, who accuses judges of ethically
violating the state's public policy).
92. See, e.g., In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Wis. 1994) (Geske J.,
concurring).
93. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 695 (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (asserting that
his "experience as a former member of the legislature" told him that the legislature
was highly unlikely to take up such a "sensitive" issue as second-parent adoptions).
However, a subcommittee of the Illinois State Bar Association's Family Law Section
has drafted a statutory amendment that would permit second-parent adoption, but
the bar association has not induded the measure in its legislative package. Hanna,
supra note 13, at 5.
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legislatures defer to the courts to deal with this political hot potato,
while state politicians berate the courts for legislating from the bench. 4
In the meantime, the tension in the system will remain, and the
right to second-parent adoption will wax and wane. 5 This situation raises
a tactical dilemma for advocacy groups seeking to advance the right. To
push for formal legalization, either through written opinion or legislation,
potentially creates greater tension which ultimately could provoke a
backlash: statutory override or judicial overrule of the existing de facto
right.96 Supporters must hope that evolving norms more tolerant of
lesbian- and gay-headed families will mute countervailing forces and
provide a foundation upon which to build a more permanent right. t
94. See, e.g., James Dao, Ruling Lets Unwed Couples Adopt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995,
at B16 (reporting that Gov. George E. Pataki said New York Court of Appeals
overstepped its boundaries by ruling second-parent adoption permitted under New
York adoption statute).
95. David W. Dunlap, Support for Gay Adoptions Seems to Wane, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1995, atA13 (quoting Tim Fisher, executive director of the Gay and Lesbian Parents
Coalition International: "We had a long series of successes with second-parent
adoptions, but recently we've had nothing but setbacks."). Cf In re Jacob, Nos. 195,
196, 1995 WL 643833 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995) (legalizing second-parent adoption).
96. See Rubenstein, supra note 66; McKee, supra note 81, at 12.
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